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From Protesters to Martyrs: How to
Become a ‘True’ Sikh
Lionel Baixas and Charlène Simon
Vangar (Challenge)
If you want peace, warriors, then pick up your
swords.
Enemy is coming for you and will challenge you.
Our ancestors shall condemn us for sitting quietly.
If we salute a lie, what kind of Sikhs are we?
Those who fly high as a hawk do not value their
death,
As they take pride in what they do, you have to
become hostile if you love Sikhism.
You have to enlighten the path
Of the community with the glitter of your
weapons.
Sing the hymns of the Gurus, this is their
acceptance.
We have to liberate our community and cut down
the cords of slavery.
The debt is still pending as renegades led to the
Fall of Akal Takht.
Our Gurus have told us: ‘Respect shall be respected
with heads’.
You are born out of Khanda. Do not sit idle
gentlemen,
Get up and jump into the fields and sharpen your
swords.
Listen to the Guru because He is whole and soul of
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your acts.
Swaran Singh, Kotdharam.
1 On 11 May 2007, the Dera Sacha Sauda1 a sect whose headquarters are located in Sirsa
district, Haryana, performed a ceremony called Jaam-e-Insa.2 This ceremony was held at
its  main  branch  in  Punjab  situated  at  Salabatpura  village  in  Bathinda  district,  the
heartland of the Malwa region. Two days later, on 13 May, several major English and
Punjabi newspapers published pictures of the Baba performing the ceremony along with a
short description of the rituals practiced there. Baba Gurmeet Ram Raheem Singh, largely
inspired by the way Guru Gobind Singh (the tenth Sikh Guru) created the Khalsa,3 asked
seven of his followers to drink an elixir called Jaam and to renounce their caste name for
the term insa (short for insaniyat or humanity). This initiation ceremony was a symbolic
rebirth by which the disciple could enter a community where the caste hierarchy does
not exist anymore. In the picture published by the press, Baba Gurmeet Singh was dressed
in a pink (the colour of DSS) dress, which looked very similar to the one in which Guru
Gobind Singh is usually depicted in the calendar art  and shown distributing Jaam to
followers. 
2 The DSS had been established in 1948.  At the beginning it  was a branch of the Dera
Radhasoami (Beas), one of the most popular sects among several castes in Punjab, which
spread a system of rituals and beliefs very close to Sikhism. Several sects similar to DSS
are  very  active  in  Punjab.  Babas,  gurus,  saints  and  deras have  always  occupied  an
important place in the religious landscape of Punjab. If the Sikh community is commonly
perceived,  despites  all  its  internal  controversies  (McLeod  1989),  as  a  religious
congregation in itself, which share a common belief in a set of myths, rituals, symbols as
well as in the Guru Granth Sahib, it has not always been the case. In its early days, the
Sikh Panth  (literally  the  ‘Way’  and  symbolically  designating  the  enlarged  Sikh
community) appeared as a multitude of distinct sects led by various gurus (Oberoi 1994:
139-207). Fluidity and plurality were thus inherent to Sikhism. However, by the end of the
19th century, a process of institutionalization, which implied both the construction of
highly delimited boundaries between religious communities (Jones 1973: 457-75) and the
homogenization of  the  Sikh identity,  took place  within Sikhism.  Although the  Singh
Sabha movement  successfully  promoted the  Tat  Khalsa (pure  khalsa)  identity  as  the
unique  and ultimate  Sikh  identity,  especially  among the  Jats  (Oberoi  1994:  207-381),
popular religion managed to survive and deras are still flourishing nowadays. The main
difference between Sikhism and the ritualistic system of beliefs promoted by these deras
lies in the faith of their followers in a living master. This living master is an aberration in
itself to the Sikh orthodoxy since in Sikhism the Guru Granth Sahib is the only holder of
the  divine  knowledge.  Nevertheless,  the  presence  of  these  deras  is  tolerated  by  the
orthodox Sikhs as soon as they show respect to the Guru Granth Sahib and to the main
symbols  of  Sikhism and  before  2007  no  clashes  occurred  between  the  DSS  and  the
orthodox Sikhs. 
3 A day after the publication of the news, on 14 May, hundreds of Sikhs armed with kirpan 
(sword) took to the streets, hurling infuriated slogans against Baba GRRS. According to
them by acting like Guru Gobind Singh, the Baba was identifying himself with the tenth
Guru of Sikhism and, as such, was denigrating the superiority of the latter. The epicentre
of this protest was the Malwa, especially Bathinda city, where the premis (literally ‘lovers’,
term used  inside  DSS  to  refer  to  its  followers) are  particularly  numerous.  Some
From Protesters to Martyrs: How to Become a ‘True’ Sikh
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 2 | 2008
2
demonstrations  also  took  place,  though  to  a  lesser  extent,  in  Haryana,  Jammu  and
Kashmir, Delhi and abroad among the Sikh Diaspora. 
4 At the time of these protests, journalists and scholars provided three distinct kinds of
explanations.  According  to  some  observers,  the  use  of  Sikh  religious  imagery  by
heterodox  sects  more  or  less  distant  from  Sikhism  is  enough  to  stir  up  the  Sikh
community’s primordial passions and have frequently propelled violent protests in the
past (The Hindu 2007). Other analysts pointed out that there was an important political
dimension in this protest (Swami, Sethi 2007). When Baba Gurmeet Singh became the
spiritual master of the dera in 2000, his nomination was supported by the Shiromani Akali
Dal (SAD), a party which is well known for its defence of the Sikh orthodoxy. But during
the last Legislative Assembly elections in February 2007, the Political Affairs Wing of the 
DSS in Punjab advised their followers to vote for Punjab Congress Party, resulting in the
unprecedented electoral victory of Congress in Malwa region, a traditional bastion of
SAD. This directive and the subsequent defeat in Malwa of the SAD’s main faction, led by
Prakash Singh Badal, which enraged the new Chief Minister of Punjab, activated a short-
term politics of revenge and exacerbated the tensions following Baba Gurmeet Singh’s
appearance in the press dressed up as Guru Gobind Singh. Finally, a third explanation has
been provided by emphasizing the caste dimension of the conflict (Ram 2007: 4066-74).
The DSS would be composed of around 70% of Scheduled Castes (SC) and would operate as
a  space  for  the  political  assertion  of  Dalits identity,  whose  members  constitute
approximately 30% of Punjab’s total population. This dynamic would have infuriated the
Jat Sikhs, an agricultural caste which owns most of the land and dominates most of the
political and religious institutions of Punjab, as they resent the rise of SC awareness and
intend to preserve their power. 
5 This wide range of explanations and the variety of motivations they suggest, show how
complex it  is  to determine afterwards the cause of  such a protest.  The first  one,  by
presenting the Sikhs as an archetype of the ‘outraged community’ who will systematically
react violently against any misuse of its symbols, is too essentialist. If religious affects can
play a role in this kind of collective mobilization, their real influence on the participation
in the dissent needs to be more rigorously assessed. The second explanation, much more
instrumentalist, also lacks of pertinence. Electoral politics may have played the role of an
amplifier but such a hypothesis is unable to take into account the religious dimension
claimed by the protesters as the only justification to their violent reaction. The last one
lacks empirical assessment: most of the followers of the DSS come from lower castes,
while its main leaders belong to upper castes, starting from Baba GRRS himself who is a
Jat. Our fieldwork at the DSS’ premises has shown us that the sect cannot in any case be
considered as a space for the political assertion of the Dalits, since in their discourses DSS’
representatives made it  clear that  SC are for  this  dera just  a  mean to increase their
following but there is no specific politics toward SC assertion. Moreover the behaviour of
the Sikh orthodoxy towards the Dalits is really ambiguous and cannot be reduced to such
an open fight (Simon forthcoming), all the more so that the depravation of the Dalits
from the Malwa doesn’t allow them to be a real threat to the domination of the Jat Sikhs. 
6 These three explanations may have played a  role  in the protest  but  they have been
formulated by outsiders who have adopted a macroscopic point of view, which is unable
to  explain  how  the  emotions  of  the  Sikh  protesters  have  been  ‘organized’  (Latté
forthcoming). A protest is always an occasion for the protesters, as well as for the rabble-
rousers, to introduce themselves in a certain way and to enact a social position. The aim
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of this article is to understand the motivation of the actors of the protests itself: How did
the Sikh protesters legitimate their reaction one year later? What kinds of reasons have
led  hundreds  of  Sikhs,  Keshdharis as  well  as  Sahajdharis,4 from  very  different  social
backgrounds to take to the streets? What kind of emotions played a role in the Sikhs’
mobilization?
7 The empirical  material  used in this  study is  based on the Indian press,  on academic
writings  and  on  semi-directive  interviews  with  Sikh  protesters  without  any  kind  of
affiliation with Sikh organizations, with Sikh leaders in Amritsar, Bathinda, Mansa and
Patiala,  with  DSS  followers  and  officials  in  Sirsa.5 It  is  finally  based  on  participant
observation of the commemoration ceremony of the memory of Kamaljeet Singh, the first
shaheed (martyr) of this protest held at his family’s residence in Sangrur district on May
18 2008. In order to really understand the influence of the emotions in the decision to
take part in protest, we have also taken into account the opinion of a few Sikhs who
claimed they hade felt offended by the DSS controversy but who have not participated in
the protest. 
8 The first part of this article will focus on the first sequence of the protest, which carried
out by individuals without any institutional framing. The actors’ narratives about the
protest and its empirical inception will be analyzed as to qualify the role of emotions and
the apparent spontaneity of  their  reaction.  The second part  will  investigate the role
played by various mainstream and radical, political and religious Sikh organizations in
the framing of the mobilization. The third part will explain how the logic of collective
mobilization has progressively been replaced by a sense of individual sacrifice and how
the initial logic of protestation has been changed to a logic of commemoration. 
 
The making of a communal protest
9 Some previous studies (Goodwin et al. 2001: 15) have shown that in most of the cases the
participants  of  a  protest  present  themselves  as  rational  actors  by  highlighting  the
material  interests  they  wanted  to  defend  through  their  participation.  But  the  Sikh
opponents  to  the  DSS  we  met  have  emphasized  the  affective  dimension  of  their
involvement.  Most  of  them  expressed  a  suffering—‘I  have  been  hurt’6—  sometimes
accompanied by a physical description of their reaction: ‘My blood heated. If he [Baba
GSRR] would have been in front of me, I would have shot him. This was the feeling of
every Sikhs’.7 In any case, according to them, the mobilization was ‘100% emotional’. It
was  the  consequence  of  an  unexpected  outrage  which  was  unthinkable:  ‘We  were
suddenly shocked and we really wondered what was happening’,8 that is to say a ‘moral
shock’ (Jasper 1998: 409). 
10 Since the representative Sikh organizations remained silent during the three first days
after  the  publication  of  the  news,  the  insulted  Sikh  masses  felt  that  it  was  their
responsibility to protest to prove what the true Sikh identity is: ‘To protest meant being a
Khalsa’,9 This association by the protesters between their religious identity and their duty
to react publicly results from the historiography that is valorised by mainstream Sikhism:
‘There is a motto in our religion which says ‘Gur ki ninda sune na kaan bheta kare sang
kirpaan’—‘If  somebody says any bad word or any bad utterance about your Guru, you
should pierce that person with the sword’.10 Since the Singh Sabha movement, which has
laid the basis of Sikh orthodoxy at the end of the 19th century by stressing the opposition
between the Sikhs,  the Hindus and the Muslims,  heroism and martyrdom have been
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presented as the two main characteristics of Sikh identity. From the beginning of the
existence of the Sikh community as a qaum,11 the idea of its persecution by the other
religious communities has always been stressed by the orthodoxy. This threat on Sikh
identity has been nurtured by events like the desecration of the Golden Temple during
the  Operation  Blue  Star  and  the  Sikh  pogroms  in  Delhi  as  well  as  the  Khalistani
movement. This exacerbated feeling of persecutions has led Sikh orthodoxy to be very
sensitive about the use of its symbols by the heterodox deras located in Punjab. In the
past, two violent clashes occurred between the Sikh community and such deras: the first
with the Nirankaris in 197812 and the second with the Dera Bhaniaravalla13 in 2000-2001. 
11 Thus, in the eyes of the protesters, the protest is embedded into an ‘emotional habitus’
(Calhoun 2001: 53) and acquires, therefore, a meaning in itself: ‘For both moral outrage
and pride,  the assertion of  agency itself  constituted part of  the meaning of  those acts.
Participation  per  se  expressed  moral  outrage,  asserted  a  claim to  dignity,  and  gave
ground for pride’ (Wood 2001: 268). This way of relating present emotion with a specific
communal tradition has a great influence on the decision to protest, on the form of the
mobilization—during our interviews,  many marchers have stressed the importance of
wearing ‘arms’ while demonstrating—but above all, on the way the protesters conceive
and interpret their reaction.  In this particular case,  the emotional  component of  the
protest can only be understood as a respect to and not as a transgression of social norms.
Emotions follow their own rationality and if outrage plays any role in the political culture
of dissent, it is only because the community which reacts on this basis valorised this kind
of emotional reaction in its repertoires of collective action. 
12 Nonetheless, many interviews reveal that the offence itself was not the only reason for
getting  involved  in  collective  demonstrations.  The  important  press  coverage  of  the
ceremony has also played a great role in the upsurge of the communal action, because it
gave an awareness of the events to a large numbers of Sikhs scattered geographically. The
media was used by the DSS from the very beginning, since the later send them a complete
set  of  pictures  and  details  about  the  Jaam-e-Insa ceremony  which  was  performed  at
Salabatpura on the 11th, whereas one week earlier the same ceremony occurred for the
first time in their headquarters without any press coverage. This manoeuvre shows the
obvious will of the DSS to provoke the Sikhs, knowing that such a public provocation
could only trigger the thunderbolt of the Sikh community:14 ‘So long as they do not come
in direct clash with Sikhism, like they hold a ceremony that goes against the principles of
Sikhism or they make such a statement that is denigrating the Sikh Gurus or the Sikh
institutions, then there will be no clash. Since its [DSS] inception in 1947 there was no
clash.  If  this  time  there  has  been  a  clash  for  the  first  time  it  is  because  of  the
advertisement’.15 A  comparison  with  the  minor  scale  contest  against  the  Dera
Bhaniaravalla in the summer 2001 illustrates this role of the press, which did not convey
any details  about  the  event  at  that  time,  in  allowing or  not  an offence  to  propel  a
collective movement. 
13 Besides, by showing explicitly the physical injuries faced by the first Sikh marchers, the
pictures  published  by  the  press  urged  their  coreligionists  to  take  part  in  the
confrontation to restore the honour of the Sikh fold: ‘People became very angry when
they saw everything on TV. First of all they [Baba GRRS and its followers] committed a
crime [imitation of Guru Gobind Singh] and then they physically attacked the Sikhs on
the 14th,  and then they gave us open challenges’.16 Thus it  is  not only the attack on
religious  symbols  which  explains  the  magnitude  of  the  dispute  as  well  as  the  huge
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number of  protesters,  but also the physical  attacks on Sikhs.  This sense of  solidarity
towards the Sikhs injured while trying to restore the pride of the Sikh folk played a great
role in increasing the number of ‘offended’ Sikhs. 
14 This  aggression  towards  the  Sikh  bodies  was  all  the  more  powerful  in  terms  of
mobilization than it refers to one of the ideological basis of Sikhism, which urges the
Sikhs to go beyond the mere status of victims. ‘It  is unacceptable that any Sikh man
should, under any circumstances, no matter the odds, accept without resistance a violent
attack against themselves and against their women and children’. The constitution of the
Sikh  Self  is  ‘heroic’  (Das  1995:  10).  Hence,  the  ‘heroic  mode’  (Yang  2005)  which  is
promoted  in  contemporary  Sikh  historiography  did  have  a  major  influence  in  the
emotional  sketches  which  have  determined  the  decision  to  react  forcefully:  ‘I  was
studying for my final exam at that time but I gave up everything to protest. I did not feel
any fear at that time. I was so aggressive that I think I could have killed anybody at that
moment! I was also ready to die’.17 This ‘bravery’ was all the more needed then as the DSS’
followers openly challenged the Sikhs when they heard about their will to demonstrate.
In Patiala, when the Sikhs asked for the closure of the main market and publicised their
demonstration journey,  a  few DSS’  followers  threatened to  kill  them if  they entered
certain places, stirring up the Sikhs’ anger: ‘They have challenged us! We had no other
choice than continuing the fight!’.18
15 The process of violent reactions and counter reactions between the Sikhs and the DSS’
followers, who also felt insulted when the Sikh demonstrators started burning the effigies
of their Baba, led to a spiral of outrage that contributed to increase the scale as well as
the vehemence of the popular protest. 
16 The presence of an identified opponent who retaliates to the collective action is also an
essential factor which needs to be taken into account in order to understand the form
taken  by  the  protest  movement  and its  ability  to  heavily  recruit  new  comers.  The
concentration of these Sikh protests in Bathinda and Mansa districts, where most of the
Punjabi followers of the DSS are living and where some branches of this dera are located,
illustrates how important is the physical proximity of the enemy to allow a collective
mobilization to take place. 
17 The  haste  in  which  the  protest  took  shape  was  clearly  due  to  the  very  efficient
mobilization of the Sikh relational networks either by phone or by proximity: ‘When we
saw the picture of Baba GRRS trying to imitate Guru Gobind Singh, we all phoned to our
relatives and decided to meet at the gurdware at 9 o’clock in order to decide what kind of
actions could be undertaken. Around 1000 people attended this meeting’.19 For a Sikh the
most important thing is to maintain his izzat in the eyes of his environment. This notion
of izzat, which has been defined by Pettigrew as ‘the complex of values regarding what
was honorable’  (Pettigrew 1975: 58-9) not only implies a number of concerns such as
power, reciprocity, protection of one’s social status but also a constant judgment from the
other  members  of  the  Sikh community.  Thus,  when Sikh individuals  were  called  by
members of their relational networks to join the demonstration in order to defend the
Sikh sense of honour, they had no other choice but to get involved, in order to preserve
their own social status. In this case, the izzat worked all the more as a driving force for the
protesters as it was not only a matter of preserving the honour of one’s family but also to
restore the honour of the entire Sikh community. As Dusenbery (1990) has noticed, Jat
Sikhs  are  so  deeply  concerned with  their  izzat  that  this  moral  as  well  as  emotional
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component of their self-construction needs to be taken into account to fully understand
their political culture of dissent. 
18 The presence of  an historical  meeting place,  the gurdwara ,  which has ever played an
important  role  in  the  Sikh  culture  of  dissent,  has  also  facilitated  the  gathering  of
outraged Sikhs: ‘A gurdwara is not just a place of worship. It is the centre of all activities
of the Sikhs. Actually, all along our history, it was never treated as a place of worship
only. Even our Sikh Gurus used to gather in gurdware all along the 18th century to decide
all political matters’.20 The choice of this particular place of gathering was also a part of
the ‘show’ which was performed by the Sikh masses while demonstrating. ‘Protest events
involve  ritual  practices,  symbolic  gestures  and  shared  experiences  of  empowering,
collective effervescence which affect the move from framed emotions to action and from
individual to collective, narrative identity’ (Flam, King 2005: 4-5). The testimonies given
by some protesters in Patiala show that the ardas (Sikh propitiatory prayer; the second
section  of  which  is  entirely  devoted  to  the  invocation  of  the  memory  of  the  Sikhs
martyrs) was carried out at the end of the gurdwara meeting and before the 16th May
demonstration. The same kind of process is again found in the example of the students’
mobilization: ‘a meeting was organized in one of the students’ room in each hostel, on the
15th in the evening to allow all Sikh students to perform a collective ardas’.21 Then a few
students of each hostel met to decide the form of the protest and ‘at the end of this
meeting we bring back our kirpan, hoisted the Nishan Sahib [flag with the Khanda—Sikh
emblem] in front of  our hostels,  gathered as much people as possible and started to
demonstrate all  around the campus to the University gate’…22 Both these testimonies
show how the use of religious symbols and rituals contributed to a dramatization of the
event that increased the protesters’ feeling of bravery and gave a wider significance to
their action, as if the future of the Sikh faith depended on them. 
19 Nonetheless both of these protests lasted only for a few hours and a great dissonance can
be noticed between the way the actors portrayed themselves as individuals who felt so
offended and whose anger was so powerful that they had no other solution but to show
publicly their emotions by protesting and participating in the collective action. If all the
Sikhs consulted felt insulted, very few of them did really take part in the protest and most
of the time, the people who expressed the highest irritation towards the outrage are the
ones who did not actually join the collective movement. Very often the Sikhs who did not
protest justify their disengagement by stressing the fact that they were not available at
that time because of some professional, academic, family reasons. By consequence, the
feeling of being outraged cannot be considered as ‘the’ trigger event which will prompt
someone into collective action. If this feeling makes the individual wonder whether he
should react or not, the implementation of the collective action is not irreversible at all
and depends much more on individual priorities and on social pressures exerted by some
kinship and friendship networks on the individual. Moreover, as soon as the protest was
institutionalized, this kind of emotion that arises spontaneously as reflection of one’s
unconscious mechanisms of self construction, faded away.
 
When Sikh organizations came to play their role
20 After remaining silent for a while, the main Sikh religious organizations, the SGPC and
the Akal Takht (Sikh supreme temporal and religious authority) were forced to intervene
due to the violence of the popular mobilization against the DSS. Giani Joginder Singh
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Vedanti, the current Akal Takht Jathedar (head priest appointed by the SGPC), convened a
Sarbat Khalsa (assembly of the whole community) on 17 May at Takht Sri Damdama Sahib
in Talwandi Sabo in the heart of the Malwa region, where Premis’  presence and Sikh
protests  were  the  strongest.  At  the  end  of  the  meeting,  the  Akal  Takht  stated  a
hukumnama (edict) calling for a social boycott of DSS’ followers, a ban on its activities in
Punjab and the arrest of Baba Gurmeet Singh within ten days. This intervention, through
old  conventional tools which  were  reinvented by  militants  during  the  Khalistan
movement,  contributed  to  significantly frame  the  collective  mobilization  by  fitting
people’s emotions into more conventional and legitimate patterns. The Akal Takht tried
to contain people’s anger and to prevent the spread of violence by inscribing the protest
into a legal frame: the carrying of kirpans was forbidden and the attack of Premis was
expressively condemned. The President of the Sikh Students Federation (SFF) branch in
Mansa told us: ‘Following 17 May, I received orders from the Akal Takht to calm down and
canalize protesters’ violence and to prevent the most radical elements from participating
in demonstrations. I was myself ordered not to participate in any demonstration and to
organize the protest at the local level [Jhandoke, Mansa district].’ 
21 Following the first hukumnama, the Akal Takht called for a peaceful bandh (strike) on 22 
May, reiterated its ultimatum to the Punjab government in other hukumnamas, organized
a ‘peace march’ on 31 May and asked for formal apologies from Baba Gurmeet Singh to
the Sikh Panth. Three successive apologies were published in the press by the DSS but all
were rejected by the Akal Takht because they were mere unsigned ‘expression of regret’.
Despite this collapse of the Sikh diplomacy, by the beginning of June, the protest was
slowing down as neither the Akal Takht nor the Punjab government—though it was led by
the  premier  Sikh  political  party,  the  SAD—tried  to  implement  the  edict  which  soon
became a dead letter.
22 This attitude represents a major change in Punjab politics. Since the Gurdwara Reform
Movement of 1920-25, the Sikh polity in Punjab traditionally revolves around three power
centres: the SGPC president, the SAD president, and the leader of SAD legislative wing
who automatically becomes chief minister when the party wins elections. Both the SGPC
and the SAD came to represent the ultimate institutional expressions of the identity of
the  Sikhs  and  its  communal  and  political  consciousness. They  entertain  close,  even
symbiotic ties with each other and the boundaries between religion and politics have
always tended to be blurred in Punjab as the Akalis are likely to strategically use religious
issues to foster their own political interests and those of the Punjabi Sikh Community.
Prakash Singh Badal, the leader of the main Akali faction and the current Chief Minister
of Punjab, was hence expected by the Sikhs to support the Akal Takht’s move against the
DSS as it was the case in 2001 when he, also as Chief Minister, asked for the closure of
Bhaniarawala’s deras and for the arrest of its head. 
23 However, the Punjab government soon dissociated itself from the protest by saying that
the hukumnamas were to be implemented by the DSS, not by the government. Badal then
compelled the SGPC and the Akal Takht to soften their stand and the protesters to respect
legality by claiming that: ‘No one will be allowed to disturb the hard-earned atmosphere
of peace and communal harmony and the government will deal firmly with anyone trying
to take law in its hands’. Badal’s conciliatory behavior was partly due to the wealth and
popularity of the DSS and to the huge national media coverage of the controversy. But the
most decisive factor was the way the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), SAD’s ally in the Punjab
coalition government, pressurized him to act immediately and firmly to diffuse sectarian
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tension,  otherwise  it  would  leave  the  government.  As  put  by  the  Punjab  BJP
spokesperson:  ‘The  image  of  shops  being  forcibly  shut  and  damaged  by  Sikh  youth
brought back memories of the days of militancy [Khalistan movement] to our supporters.
The Baba has undoubtedly done wrong but the inaction by the Badal government is not
justified. We want Badal to ensure that the radical elements of the Sikh community do not
take centre stage’. 
24 While experiencing a tension between its ecclesiastical-organizational dimension and its
political dimension, the SAD (B) gave preference to its own political interests over the
defense of the Sikh faith. Badal subsequently managed to pressurize the SGPC and the
Akal Takht due to the current specific configuration of the Sikh political system. Since
1985, Badal is occupying both the post of SAD president and of leader of the legislative
wing  and  recently  his  son  became  SAD  president  while  he  remained  Punjab  Chief
Minister.  It  is  the  first  time  in  Akali  politics  that  such  a  dynastic move  occurred.
Moreover, since 1999, Badal managed to impose his hegemony over the SGPC and the
Akal Takht by replacing their heads with loyalists (Vaugier-Chatterjee 1999: 96-101). This
hegemony and the compulsions of coalition politics thus forced Badal to unwillingly act
as an agent of moderation and secularization in Punjab politics (Narang 1999: 664-5).
Indeed, by the end of May onward, only sporadic and small-scale protests took place.
25 Badal’s successful intervention to stall the protest against the DSS was strongly resented
by a small group of former Khalistanis who had dedicated their life to the independence
of  a  Punjab  state  during  the  1980s-90s  and  are  now  reconverted  into  conventional
politics. They stigmatized Badal as a ‘traitor to the Sikh Panth’ and accused the SGPC and
the Akal Takht of being his stooges. According to Daljit Singh Bittu, the current convener
of Khalsa Action Committee, ‘This SGPC is under the direct control of SAD. They are not
independent, even these Jathedars from Takhts, they are just like the employees of SGPC
and SGPC is entirely the employee of Badal. They have killed all the real structures of Sikh
institutions. Akal Takht is not independent now, it’s under control’. As a consequence,
they felt the need to merge their various radical political and religious organizations into
a common platform from which they could spearhead the struggle against the DSS: the
Khalsa Action Committee (KAC). The main aim of the KAC, as explained by its former
convener  and  President  of  the  Delhi  Sikh  Gurdwara  Management  Committee,  is  to
implement  the  demands  expressed  in  the  hukumnama:  ‘If  SGPC  was  taking  its
responsibilities, there would be no need to create the KAC. The KAC was created to take
action against  the DSS because the mainstream Sikh organizations refused to act,  to
honor the Sikhs and to punish GRRS. It was also formed to put pressure on both Punjab
and central government’. 
26 Contrary to the Akal Takht and SAD (B), the protagonists of the KAC tried to preserve and
prolong the emotional dimension of the initial collective action. KAC leaders presented
themselves as  the real  leaders of  the masses,  criticized the corruption of  other Sikh
leaders  and  denounced  the  manipulation  of  the  ‘Hindu  (anti-minority)  state’.  This
minority group interprets this controversy with the DSS as one more confirmation of
their perception of the reality: the ‘brahmanical’ state is once again trying to undermine
the Sikh community. This feeling of an historical injustice towards the Sikhs organized by
a Hindu conspiracy as well as their strong minority complex (Sikhs are barely a majority
in Punjab (55%) and a minority (2%) at the national level) have always been stressed by
the Sikh orthodoxy to foster great mobilizations among Sikhs. This rhetoric of the Sikhs
as a threatened community was first used by the Singh Sabha movement (1875-1905), was
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later  reiterated  by  the  Gurdwara  Reform  movement  (1920-25),  by  the  Punjabi  Suba
movement (1950-66), by the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1973) as well as by the Khalistan
movement (1978-95), and is still an important argument exposed by the KAC to legitimate
its protest against the DSS. Thus, for all these ex-Khalistani militants to protest means to
defend their ideals; ideals that have already driven most of them through the sufferings
of torture and imprisonment. Today all these militants have reintegrated a society, which
has neither really believed in their fight nor really valorised their involvement.23 This
kind of  protest  is  an opportunity for them to recreate a social  role,  which they had
already endorsed before and which will allow their lifelong involvement to gain some
kind of legitimacy in the eyes of the other members of the society. 
27 Since its inception, the KAC constitutes the sole common platform from which the protest
against the DSS is still organized. It undertook various activities such as protest marches
and lectures on deras’ threat in general and especially on the struggle against the DSS.
However, these events, which occurred from time to time, drew only deceptively small
crowds,  far  smaller  than during the first  week of  the protest.  As  time went  on,  the
intensity  of  the  emotions  faded  away  and  the  presence  of  outraged  protesters
irremediably fell off. The KAC completely fail to revive the protest to its initial scale. At
the same time, the repertoire of action gradually shifted: from collective mobilization to
individual sacrifice, and from protestation to commemoration.
 
The use of the ‘traditional’ Sikh repertoire of
mobilization
28 The  KAC  tried  to  exploit  people’s  emotions  through  the  instrumentalization  of
martyrdom, a traditional heroic idiom particularly strong in the Sikh religion and history
(Fenech 2005), with the hope to revive the movement. These so called Sikh ‘martyrs’ have
not  willingly  chosen  to  die  for  the  defense  of  Sikhism,  as  their  newly  constructed
hagiography points it, but were mere victims in the course of the protest. They were only
subsequently transformed from victims into martyrs in order to emulate others to kill
Baba Gurmeet Singh.
29 Kamaljeet  Singh,  a  married electrician of  27 years  age living in a village of  Sangrur
district, was the first to be elevated, only ten days after his death24 and in the presence of
all the major Sikh leaders, to the status of shaheed (martyr) that is ‘the one who lays down
his life at the feet of his Guru by love for his Guru’. His decision to take part in the protest
seemed to arise not only from a genuine sense of outrage but also from his need to assert
that he is  a ‘true’  Sikh in his quest for social  recognition.  According to his wife,  his
‘conversion’ to Sikhism was due to his lack of integration in his village. Kamaljit Singh
actually belonged to the Sunyar caste, an unusual fact in Punjab especially for a Sikh as it
is a Brahmin caste. He was the first member of his family to take amrit. Since then he
devoted most of his time to do sewa (community service) and created a small organization
to promote the Sikh faith.
30 However, though Kamaljeet Singh was among the perpetrators who first attack the dera,
as per his wife’s testimony, he was not willingly ready to die, hence resembling more a
victim than a martyr. As a matter of fact, it is neither the manner nor the reason of his
death  that  makes  him a  shaheed but  the  subsequent  reconstruction  of  it  by  others.
Referring to the martyrs of the Khalistan movement, Laurent Gayer explains that ‘the
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individual sacrificial trajectories then faded into the martyrdom strategies displayed by
identity entrepreneurs. Through these hagiographic discourses, the martyr becomes a
political artifact’ (Gayer 2006: 114). Kamaljeet’s death experienced the same post-mortem
hagiographic  phenomenon.  He  has  been  quickly  introduced  in  the  pantheon  of  the
Khalistan shaheeds as it  can be seen in this picture bought in June 2008 in the small
market next to the Golden Temple complex.
 
Figure 1. Hagiographic painting of the most famous Khalistan shaheeds
Top, from left to right: Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, head of Damdami Taksal and
iconic ﬁgure of the Khalistan movement, Bhai Amrik Singh, his right-hand man and
President of All India Sikh Student Federation, and Surinder Singh Sodhi; Mid-range, from
left to right: Kamaljeet Singh, Bhai Sukhdev Singh Sukha and Bhai Harjinder Singh Jinda,
who killed General Vaidiya, the architect of Blue Star Operation, and Bhai Satwant Singh,
Bhai Kehar Singh and Bhai Beant Singh, the conspirators and killers of Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi; down: Bhai Jagtar Singh Hawara and Bhai Balwant Singh, who killed Chief
Minister of Punjab Beant Singh. 
31 While his wife first stressed the uselessness of her husband’s death, she then reverted to
the same discourse by explaining to us: ‘He died for the sake of his nation and sacrificed
his life for his Guru,  which is,  for me, a permanent source of pride and strength’.  It
represents for her a way to capitalize on her husband’s death in order to get symbolic and
material advantages.
32 Three Sikhs, Swaran Singh, Mohinder Singh and Hoshiar Singh, later tried to emulate this
tradition of heroism and martyrdom by attempting to kill Gurmeet Singh through a bomb
blast with RDX against his convoy on GT road in Karnal district, Haryana, on 2 February
2008, allegedly under the guidance of a former Khalistani militant called Bakhshish Singh,
but all  failed and were jailed.  These candidates to martyrdom are young male Sikhs,
relatively educated but coming from backward rural areas, which see their sacrifice as an
opportunity to glorify them and to enhance their family’s prestige. The case of Swaran
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Singh, an unmarried 26 years old painter, is particularly interesting as he is coming from
a family of Namdhari25 and took amrit only two years ago. As Kamaljit Singh, he was a
‘newborn’  Sikh  and  probably  also  willing  to  prove  the  authenticity  of  his  new Sikh
identity to others. His father explained to us that the determining event which motivated
his choice was a meeting with Sarabjeet Singh, an MP from Bathinda and the son of
shaheed Beant Singh, Indira Gandhi’s killer, as he was deeply moved by the respect and
the  success  Beant’s  family  got  through  his  ‘sacrifice’.  He  then  became  a  Keshdhari
following  a  Youth  Awareness  Camp  organized  by  SSF  in  Mansa  and  entered  the
organization.  Following Baba  Gurmeet’s  offence,  he  was  in  charge  of  mobilizing  and
leading people from his village to protest. But realizing that no protestation would bear
fruit, he allegedly decided to resort to violence. 
33 Daljit Singh Bittu, the current convener of the KAC, was the only one to pay a visit to the
families of these Bahadurs (braves) and to praise their courage. It seems that for the KAC
these acts now constitute the main mean to pursue the protest. He explained to us that:
‘When people don’t get justice, then individuals wake up and seek justice by themselves.
Don’t think this movement will slow down or be wiped out. Everybody knows and expects
it. The KAC won’t do it but individuals will’. These attempts hence fit into a constructed
‘tradition’  and  allow  its  reactivation  by  emulating  others.  ‘Such  an  occurrence  may
contain and collect enough energy and coherence to generate similar events in the future
as well as recall the memory of those in the past. This sequence of events can set in
motion  a  process  of  collective  will  formation  whereby  individual  identities  and
biographies are fused into a collective characterized by feelings of group belongingness,
solidarity, common purpose and shared memory, a movement in other words’ (Eyerman
2005: 45). Nonetheless, although mobilization peaked after the death of each new victim-
turned-martyr,26 it was only for a very short span of time and it soon receded. 
34 The politico-religious idiom of ‘pugnacious dolorism’ (Gayer 2008: 4), which valorised the
individual suffering of the Sikh martyrs while stressing their voluntary sacrifice, has also
been used in the course of the DSS’ protest to prompt the collective mobilization of the
Sikhs. The commemoration ceremony of the first anniversary of Kamaljit Singh’s death,
which took place on 18 May 2008 at his parent’s place in Sangrur district had a rehearsal
function  that  consisted  in  accentuating  the  importance  of  the  shaheeds in  the
construction of the Sikh Panth, which is assimilated as ‘a race whose history has been
written in the blood of its martyrs’ (Gayer 2006: 129). During the four and a half hours
program in honour of Kamaljit Singh’s memory, the different speakers and singers have
constantly emphasised his will to die for the defence of the Sikh faith, his courage has
several times been compared with the bravery of Sant Bhindrawale and the Jathedar of
Talwandi  Sabo has even related his  fate with Guru Tegh Bahadur’s  and Guru Arjan’s
destinies.  All  these  comparisons  are  parts  of  the  didactic  process,  which  makes
contemporary Sikhs believe that they can still be actors of this long tradition aiming at
protecting the authentic tenets of Sikhism: ‘The sacrifice of Kamaljit Singh is a part of our
history. We have to learn from our history, we have to get motivation; we have to get
inspiration from it. So for us this commemoration ceremony is as important as for India
to celebrate its Independence Day’.27 In addition to the glorification of Kamaljit Singh who
was  depicted  as  a  hero,  all  the  speeches  delivered  during  the  ceremony  urged  the
audience to meditate on this sacrifice and to consider it as a driving force, which should
guide their future action. 
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35 The tonality of the speeches delivered during this program cannot be assimilated with
the free expression of an individual’s feeling about the death of one of his relatives. On
the  contrary,  it  clearly  proves  the  existence  of  a  specific  language  register  for  the
evocation of the martyrs in Sikhism, which contributes to the edification of a common
collective  memory.  For  the  Sikhs,  the  commemoration  is  just  an  emotional  means
intending to reinforce their collective identity. This conventional role of the ceremony
appears in the selection of the persons who have been called upon to deliver a speech:
within the family and relatives of Kamaljit Singh, only his wife made a speech, whose
emotive content was much more akin to a customary theatrical self presentation than to
a  spontaneous  expression  of  her  sufferings.  The  intervention  of  the  other  speakers,
mostly local  Sikh representatives such as members of  the management committee of
surrounding gurdware and Sikh saints, and more strikingly the way the ceremony was
organized, illustrates how the ‘commemorative space’ is also a ‘conflicting space’ where
political stakes, ideological dissents and social will  of individual assertion intermingle
(Latté 2008: 3). 
36 During the celebration of Baisakhi on 14 April 2008 the KAC foretold its will to organize a
program on the occasion of the first anniversary of Kamaljit Singh’s death. Few days later,
the SGPC and the Jathedar of Talwandi Sabo publicized their decision to organize this
particular program and then planned to do it on 18 May 2008 in the main gurdwara of
Sangrur city. Pleased to hear that the representative bodies of Sikhism were ready to fully
undertake their responsibility on this issue, the KAC freed itself from the organization of
the commemoration. Nevertheless on 16 May 2008 Kamaljit Singh’s family was informed
by the SGPC of  its  will  to postpone the celebration.  Rendered helpless  by this  news,
Kamaljit Singh’s family phoned to Daljit Singh Bittu, who immediately activated his local
network  to  arrange  a  commemoration  at  a  small  scale.  Three  days  later  the
commemoration took place, gathering less than 300 people, mostly members of Kamaljit
Singh’s family, relatives, inhabitants of the village and few local Sikh representatives who
raised their voices against the ‘sabotage’ of the ceremony by the government of Punjab. 
 
Conclusion
37 The failure of this commemoration and of the perpetuation of the protest shows how
difficult it is to ‘organize the emotions’ (Latté forthcoming) in the long run. Despite the
emotional tonalities of the testimonies of the Sikhs on the DSS’ controversy, one year
after its  implementation,  the  protest  had almost  come to  an end.  None of  our  Sikh
interlocutors, who claimed to be ready to die for their faith and stressed on the need to
keep the memory of Kamaljit Singh’s sacrifice alive attended, once month later, to the
commemoration of his death, nor did most of the representatives of the KAC since only
Daljit Singh Bittu was present. Only for few former militants of the Khalistani movement
and few people very close to this group does the protest against the DSS still  have a
‘raison d’être’, which prompts them to act.
38 This  particular  case-study  of  a  mobilization  around  religious  symbols  should  be
understood as a minority mode of legitimisation in the long run but cannot be reduced to
a popular mode of assertion since, even in its first stage; the demonstration gathered all
kind of Sikhs, Keshdharis as well as Sahajdharis, with very different social and economic
backgrounds. Moreover, that kind of protest cannot be reduced to an urban phenomenon:
in this  example,  if  the main demonstrations took place in cities,  at  least  half  of  the
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protesters came from surrounding villages and this protest had a particular significance
mostly for the rural Jat Sikh farmers of the Malwa, a region that has benefited from the
Green Revolution but that is now enduring a sizeable decline. For them, the protest was
also a means to reassert their domination as leaders of the Malwa, to convince themselves
that they still have an influence on the society they belong to; influence that is day after
day escaping from their hands.
39 Nonetheless the ability of so many Sikhs, who have offered us very different definitions of
what it means to be a Sikh, to mobilize spontaneously as soon as they felt that somebody
was  insulting  their  faith,  contributes  to  enforce  the  perception  of  the  Sikhs  as  the
archetype of the outraged community. This case-study shows that not any community
can pretend to be outraged. This specific mode of collective mobilization requires an
elaborated historical tradition, as well as a constant feeling of threat on the community
and the  conviction  of  a  collective  honour  which  always  needs  to  be  reasserted  and
preserved. Finally, this mode of assertion is able to mobilize a large amount of people
only for a short time.
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NOTES
1. A dera is a place of worship and Sacha Sauda means true bargain with god and refers to an
event of the life of Nanak, the first Sikh Guru, in which he used the money his father gave him to
feed some Saddhus instead of purchasing some goods in the city that he could then sell in the
village to make some profit as his father asked him. Nanak truly felt he had done a true bargain
and this event is interpreted as the origin of the institution of langar, the free kitchen to be found
in every gurdwara open to everyone. The DSS presents itself not as a new religion or sect (in the
Indian sense)  but  rather  as  an all-embracing  spiritual  movement.  This  ecumenism is  clearly
expressed in their chief’s name: Ram refers to Hinduism, Raheem to Islam and Singh to Sikhism.
2. We are thankful to Laurent Gayer for his precious reading advices. We are also very grateful to
Christine Moliner, to Professors Gurharpal Singh and W.H Mc Leod and to Aarij Bashir for their
valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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3. In  1699,  Guru  Gobind  Singh  created  the  Khalsa in  order  to  distinguish  the  Sikhs  and  to
generate a feeling of community belonging among them. In that perspective, Guru Gobind Singh
insisted on the importance of wearing five symbols as well as the adoption of the name Singh for
men and Kaur for women. He also instituted the initiatory ritual, which consists in taking amrit—
a sweet liquid which is considered to be a symbol of the divine nectar—by getting the Panj Piare
—literally the ‘Five Beloved’—baptised.
4. Keshdhari Sikhs : other  name  for  the  Sikhs  who  belong  to  the  Khalsa—  Sikh  orthodoxy. 
Sahajdhari Sikhs: Sikhs who didn’t take the Khalsa initiation and do not wear its five symbols but
who consider themselves as Sikhs according to their beliefs. 
5. All these interviews have been conducted during a fieldwork in Punjab and Haryana from the
14th to the 25th April 2008.
6. Expression commonly used by most of our Sikhs interlocutors while talking about the DSS
controversy.
7. A Sikh from Haryana who lives 270km away from the DSS (2008). Interview by the authors, ,
Delhi, 14 March.
8. Sikh students of Patiala University (2008). Interview by the authors, Patiala, 25 March.
9. President of the Patiala Sikh Students Federation (2008). Interview by the authors, Patiala, 25
March.
10. President of the Patiala Sikh Students Federation (2008). Interview by the authors, Patiala, 25
March.
11. In the Indian context, the term qaum is used to define a ‘great’ religious tradition which has
important communitarian as well as orthodox dimensions such as the Christians, the Muslims or
the Sikhs.
12. On 13 April 1978, the Akhand Kirtani Jatha gathered together from all over India at Amritsar
to hold their yearly festival called Vaisakhi Smagam. At the same time followers of Nirankari
chief  Gurbachan  Singh  were  holding  a  procession  in  Amritsar  and  were  shouting  insulting
slogans directed at the Guru Granth Sahib and the Sikh religion. Members of the Akhand Kirtani
Jatha and of the Damdami Taksal, organizations which believed that the Nirankari sect was a
stooge of the Indian government and part of the latter conspiracy to undermine the Sikh faith
and community, went on to protest against this congregation. A clash ensued and 13 Sikhs were
fired at. A case was then registered against Gurbachan Singh but he was eventually acquitted. He
was subsequently killed by Bhai Ranjit Singh, an Akhand Kirtani Jatha member, on 24 April 1980.
Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale emerged after the Amritsar Massacre, which is often depicted as
the starting point of the Khalistan movement—an ethnonationalist and secessionist movement
meant to secure a  Sikh homeland where Sikhism could be preserved—, as  the pivotal  figure
spearheading the Sikh response to the Indian government of Indira Gandhi.
13. During the summer 2000, Baba Bhaniara asked some of his followers to compose a new sacred
book: the Bhavsagar Granth, because the use of the Guru Granth Sahib to performed an akhand
path—propitiatory ritual  in Sikhism which consists  in the uninterrupted reading of  the Guru
Granth Sahib during three days—has been refused to one of his SC disciple. In the summer 2001,
the Bhavsagar Granth, whose content was very similar to the Guru Granth Sahib, was used in the
premises of the dera and the Baba showed himself dressed like Guru Gobind Singh on particular
occasions.  Some orthodox Sikh organizations considered this  as  an offence and launched an
attack  against  this  dera in  September  2001.  Then  the  government  of  Punjab  prohibited  the
Bhavsagar Granth, all the branches of the dera were either destroyed by some Sikhs protesters or
placed under the management of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) and
Baba Bhaniara was arrested.
14. The hypothesis of a deliberate provocation from the DSS appears to us as an obvious fact
since in Punjab all the religious leaders of sects considered as ‘heretics’ by the Sikh orthodoxy
know the  following  rule  pretty  well  as  shown by  M.  Juergensmeyer  (1988).  Nonetheless  our
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fieldwork at the DSS did not allow us to understand the reasons of this provocation since the
followers we met there were very sensitive about this issue and suspicious towards us. 
15. President of the Patiala Sikh Students Federation (2008). Interview by the authors, Patiala, 25
March.
16. Sikh protesters from Patiala (2008). Interview by the authors, Patiala, 25 March.
17. A Sikh student of Patiala University (2008). Interview by the authors, Patiala, 25 March.
18. Sikh protesters from Patiala (2008). Interview by the authors, Patiala, 25 March.
19. Sikh protesters from Patiala (2008). Interview by the authors, Patiala, 25 March.
20. President of the Patiala Sikh Students Federation (2008). Interview by the authors, Patiala, 25
March.
21. Sikh students of Patiala University (2008). Interview by the authors, Patiala, 25 March.
22. Sikh students of Patiala University (2008). Interview by the authors, Patiala, 25 March.
23. Laurent  Gayer  states:  ‘The  majority  of  the  Sikh  population,  in  Punjab  as  well  as  in  the
Diaspora, has very soon turn its interest away from the Khalistani movement, whose popular
supports have always been restricted, mostly reduced to the most practicing sections of the Jat
caste, who appreciated the revivalist speeches of Bhindranwale’. (forthcoming article)
24. On 17 May 2007, following the Sarbat Khalsa at Damdama Sahib in Talwandi Sabo, a group of
angry protesters attacked the main branch of DSS in Punjab at Salabatpura ont their way back to
Sangrur  despite  the  exhortation addressed by  the  Sikh leaders  not  to  indulge  into  violence.
Kamaljeet Singh was among the assailants. He was stabbed several times in the chest by Premis
during the clash and died the day after at the hospital from his injuries.
25. Namdhari  or  Kuka  Sikhs  are  the  members  of  an  orthodox  sect  of  Sikhism.  Their  main
differences with mainstream Sikhs are their belief in Jagjit Singh as their living Guru and the fact
that they give equal importance to the Adi Granth and the Dasam Granth (the holy book written
by the 10th Guru, Guru Gobind Singh).
26. On 20 June 2008, a bodyguard of Baba Gurmeet Singh fired at a group of persons protesting
against him in a mall in suburban Mulund in Mumbai. One Sikh protester, Balkar Singh Thakur,
was injured and died later. Following his death, street violence, destruction of DSS’ properties
and disruption of public life occurred both in Mumbai and across Punjab. However, the protest
vanished after a rail  roko (block railway) agitation in Punjab on 25 June organized by groups
affiliated  to  KAC.  Then,  on  18  July  2008  clashes  occurred  in  Mandi  Dabwali,  Sirsa  district,
Haryana,  between Premis and Sikh protesters when the latter tried to prevent the former to
conduct their naamcharcha (morning prayer). A young Sikh, Mandal Singh, was killed in heavy
brick-batting  which  left  30  other  Sikhs  injured.  Soon  thereafter,  mobs  went  on  rampage,
damaged shops and set ablaze others. Curfew was imposed and army deployed in order to restore
law and order.
27. President of the Sikh Students Federation Patiala (2008). Interview by the authors, Patiala, 25
March.
ABSTRACTS
This  article  studies  the  protest  which  started  in  Punjab  in  May  2007  following  a  ceremony
performed by Baba Gurmeet Ram Raheem Singh (GRRS), head of Dera Sacha Sauda, which was
considered as blasphemous by a section of the Sikh community. The aim of this article is  to
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understand  the  motivation  of  the  actors  of  the  protest  itself:  How  did  the  Sikh  protesters
legitimate their reaction one year later? What kinds of reasons have led hundreds of Sikhs from
very different social background to take the streets? What kind of emotions played a role in the
Sikhs’ mobilization?
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